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Australia's defense‑funded report hypes risks to subsea cables to 'serve military goals'_我的网站

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5月18日,美国退役海军上将、前北约驻欧洲最高盟军司令詹姆斯·斯塔夫里迪斯表示,美国面临的最大威胁不是俄罗斯、中国或伊朗,而是美国社会内部的分裂。 
Illustration: Liu Rui/GTA new report funded by Australia's Department of Defense played up security risks to submarine cables in the Indo-Pacific waters and pointed finger at China and some other countries over alleged undersea‑cable attacks in recent years, while claiming threats against subsea cables are growing. A Chinese expert said that accusing China without conclusive evidence constitutes "over‑securitization" made by Australian side, as well as a calculated pretext for its own military expansion.
Published by the National Security College at the Australian National University (ANU), the paper claimed recent damage to cables in the Baltic Sea and around China's Taiwan region suggests "state actors are now actively probing and testing cable infrastructure in peacetime as part of broader hybrid warfare strategies" to rapidly degrade connectivity at the outset of a conflict, The Australian reported.
The paper claimed 16 privately owned subsea cables that carry 99 percent of Australia's internet traffic are a "high priority target" for Australia's adversaries that could be severed in a conflict, threatening the nation's economy and social fabric, according to The Australian.
The report singled out China and Russia for blame, saying that there have been multiple apparent attacks on submarine cables in recent years in European waters as well as near China's Taiwan region, suspected to be linked to Russia and China, the Straits Times reported.
However, the report cites a 2025 voyage by Chinese research vessel Tan Suo Yi Hao along Australia's western and southern coastlines as evidence to back its claim that "potential adversaries are actively gathering information about Australia's cable infrastructure."
This report, relying on the routine scientific operations of a Chinese research vessel in 2025 to level allegations of offensive actions against China, and employing ambiguous terminology such as "suspected" and "potential," demonstrates Australia's evidentiary leap, Chen Hong, director of the Australian Studies Center of East China Normal University, told the Global Times on Monday.
This erroneous claim was refuted by the Chinese Foreign Ministry at the time. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said on March 31, 2025 that China carries out normal activities at sea in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS.
"We hope Australia will have a right understanding of this and stop the groundless suspicion and speculations," Guo added.
This is not the first time certain Australian politicians has leveled baseless accusations of China intending to sabotage its undersea cables. Back in May, Defense Minister Richard Marles claimed during the Shangri-La Dialogue that China ought to boost transparency around its maritime operations. He also asserted that a surge in damage to subsea cables had transformed the seabed into a "battlefield," per The Australian.
Chen said Australian side's scaremongering is tied to its predictive threat‑perception framework forged in recent years. This framework designates China and other countries as strategic competitors in advance, subsequently forces routine scientific activities into a confrontational framework, Chen said.
Apart from unfounded allegations against China, the paper claims Australia's defense military "must incorporate the defense of submarine cable infrastructure into its operational planning," according to The Australian.
It added the government should also consider up¬grading an auxiliary ship operated by the navy, ADV Guidance, to enable it to repair damaged cables.
The vast majority of submarine cable damages are caused by accidental factors such as fishing operations and vessel anchoring, rather than deliberate sabotage. For suspected cases of intentional damage, independent technical investigation bodies should be established, and the principle of "investigate first, characterize later" should be strictly applied, so as to prevent ordinary maritime accidents from escalating into diplomatic conflicts, Chen said.
The core problem of Australian side's submarine cable security lies entirely with itself. Instead of addressing its own infrastructure shortcomings and improving its domestic protection and maintenance systems, the Australian side has chosen to continually exaggerate external threats and stoke bloc confrontation, the expert added.
Chen said that by fabricating alleged Chinese threats, Australian side seeks to "rationalize" its military spending increases and underwater force expansion. The submarine digital infrastructure originally meant to serve global development has been labeled along us versus them lines, and this constitutes the biggest hidden danger, he added.
。这位前欧洲北约总司令在媒体的专栏中指出了对于美国比俄罗斯更重要的威胁。

Published by the National Security College at the Australian National University (ANU), the paper claimed recent damage to cables in the Baltic Sea and around China's Taiwan region suggests "state actors are now actively probing and testing cable infrastructure in peacetime as part of broader hybrid warfare strategies" to rapidly degrade connectivity at the outset of a conflict, The Australian reported.
The paper claimed 16 privately owned subsea cables that carry 99 percent of Australia's internet traffic are a "high priority target" for Australia's adversaries that could be severed in a conflict, threatening the nation's economy and social fabric, according to The Australian.
The report singled out China and Russia for blame, saying that there have been multiple apparent attacks on submarine cables in recent years in European waters as well as near China's Taiwan region, suspected to be linked to Russia and China, the Straits Times reported.
However, the report cites a 2025 voyage by Chinese research vessel Tan Suo Yi Hao along Australia's western and southern coastlines as evidence to back its claim that "potential adversaries are actively gathering information about Australia's cable infrastructure."
This report, relying on the routine scientific operations of a Chinese research vessel in 2025 to level allegations of offensive actions against China, and employing ambiguous terminology such as "suspected" and "potential," demonstrates Australia's evidentiary leap, Chen Hong, director of the Australian Studies Center of East China Normal University, told the Global Times on Monday.
This erroneous claim was refuted by the Chinese Foreign Ministry at the time. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said on March 31, 2025 that China carries out normal activities at sea in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS.
"We hope Australia will have a right understanding of this and stop the groundless suspicion and speculations," Guo added.
This is not the first time certain Australian politicians has leveled baseless accusations of China intending to sabotage its undersea cables. Back in May, Defense Minister Richard Marles claimed during the Shangri-La Dialogue that China ought to boost transparency around its maritime operations. He also asserted that a surge in damage to subsea cables had transformed the seabed into a "battlefield," per The Australian.
Chen said Australian side's scaremongering is tied to its predictive threat‑perception framework forged in recent years. This framework designates China and other countries as strategic competitors in advance, subsequently forces routine scientific activities into a confrontational framework, Chen said.
Apart from unfounded allegations against China, the paper claims Australia's defense military "must incorporate the defense of submarine cable infrastructure into its operational planning," according to The Australian.
It added the government should also consider up¬grading an auxiliary ship operated by the navy, ADV Guidance, to enable it to repair damaged cables.
The vast majority of submarine cable damages are caused by accidental factors such as fishing operations and vessel anchoring, rather than deliberate sabotage. For suspected cases of intentional damage, independent technical investigation bodies should be established, and the principle of "investigate first, characterize later" should be strictly applied, so as to prevent ordinary maritime accidents from escalating into diplomatic conflicts, Chen said.
The core problem of Australian side's submarine cable security lies entirely with itself. Instead of addressing its own infrastructure shortcomings and improving its domestic protection and maintenance systems, the Australian side has chosen to continually exaggerate external threats and stoke bloc confrontation, the expert added.
Chen said that by fabricating alleged Chinese threats, Australian side seeks to "rationalize" its military spending increases and underwater force expansion. The submarine digital infrastructure originally meant to serve global development has been labeled along us versus them lines, and this constitutes the biggest hidden danger, he added.
。这位前欧洲北约总司令在媒体的专栏中指出了对于美国比俄罗斯更重要的威胁。
斯塔夫里利斯说,最重要的是,他担心围绕美国国家安全政策(包括对乌克兰和以色列的支持)的例行分歧如何演变成国会、大学校园和网上的内讧。因此,斯塔夫里迪斯在美国国会和美国大学的亲巴勒斯坦抗议活动中暗示了美国对乌克兰和以色列援助资金的协调,持续了六个多月。
斯塔夫里迪斯认为,为了避免这种情况,不仅应该奖励军队,还应该奖励医生、消防员、警察和外交官,以及年轻人和志愿者,因为他们为国家做出了贡献。此外,这位前北约总司令表示,有必要改变教育制度,提高学生的互联网素养和公民意识,并创建更多负担得起的社区大学。
斯塔夫里迪斯认为,美国的选举制度也需要改革。他建议向更广泛的选民开放初选,而不仅仅是党员。此外,他提请注意许多美国人既不与共和党也不与民主党有联系的事实,并提议扩大排名选择投票的可能性,以便可以表明对其他党派候选人的偏好。
5月9日,斯塔夫里迪斯在媒体的一篇文章中表示,有必要使俄罗斯城市加里宁格勒中立,这样位于立陶宛和波兰边境的苏瓦乌基走廊就不会落入莫斯科的控制之下。这位前北约总司令还称加里宁格勒是爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚、立陶宛和北约其他国家之间的地理楔子。(白罗斯理想社)
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